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Abstract
The study examines balance sheet changes at Texas commercial banks following the 1980
bank deregulation.  A comparison of selected deposit and asset variables for 1978 (pre-deregulation)
and 1987 (post-deregulation) reveals a rapid increase in costly deposits and a decline in the proportion
of loans in general,  and agricultural loans in particular, relative to total bank assets.  Although a weak
Texas economy during this time period contributed to the observed asset reallocation, banks were also
responding to the increased deposit costs and interest rate volatility following deregulation.  This
conclusion is consistent with previous findings cited in the study.
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Introduction
Commercial banks have experienced a high and more volatile cost of funds following the elimination of
Regulation Q in 1980.  To compensate for the higher and riskier cost of funds, banks have actively
sought ways to remain profitable.  Their response has included cost control measures, portfolio
adjustments, adjustable loan pricing, and a search for other sources of revenue.  Several studies have
examined the effect of deregulation on bank profitability, but little work has been done on the effect of
deregulation on commercial bank asset allocation.
Moreover, the few studies found in the agricultural economics literature that have looked at the
relationship between deposit structure and loan portfolios used pre-1980 data, i.e., before deregulation
(Barkley et al.; Barry and Pepper) and/or limited their analysis to agricultural banks (Barry and
Pepper).  However, nonagricultural banks that hold more than $2 million in farm loans are the most
important single bank group financing agriculture today and their importance is increasing (Leatham
and Hopkin).  Thus, there is a need to extend the analysis to a broader set of commercial banks.  There
is also a need to extend the analysis to the post-deregulation era because commercial banks have
switched from demand deposits to interest bearing deposits since deregulation, which has increased the
cost of their liabilities (Keely and Zimmermann).  This has been exacerbated by the increased interest
rate volatility since deregulation and has a potential impact on bank asset allocation behavior.  Thus,
there is need to re-visit the issue of asset portfolio structure in a post-deregulation environment.
The purpose of this study is to assess changes in deposit and asset composition at Texas commercial
banks after deregulation.  This study will help academicians, bankers, and public policy makers
understand the likely impact of commercial bank deregulation on agricultural credit.  Although the data
used in the study are unique to Texas, the inferences drawn can be extended to commercial banks in the
rest of the United States.  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) call reports on condition and
income were used to obtain balance sheet information for banks.  The study examined changes in the
means of selected deposit and asset categories, all measured as proportions of total deposits and assets,2
respectively, to test for possible shifts in the composition of these categories between 1978 (pre-
deregulation) and 1987 (post deregulation).  Separate tests were conducted for rural versus urban
banks, and independent banks versus banks affiliated with multi-bank holding companies.
A Review of the Literature
During the 1930s, Congress mandated interest rate ceilings on certain types of deposits, a regulation
that is commonly called Regulation Q.  However, these ceilings were eliminated under the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of March 1980.
1 With deregulation,
the deposit composition of banks started changing dramatically.
2 The most notable changes were (a) the
switch from small time deposits (i.e., time deposits less than $100,000) to MMDAs, which shortened
the maturity of the retail deposits held by commercial banks, and (b) the switch from demand deposits
to interest bearing deposits, which increased banks' cost of funds.  Some studies have shown that banks
reacted to the resulting decline in the spread between the rates received on interest earning assets and
the rates paid on their liabilities by increasing the use of adjustable-rate loans, and shortening loan
maturities.
Brown, for example, presents results of a survey in which she studied the management practices of
community banks (assets valued at $25m - $175m) that had continued to be profitable during the early
stages of deregulation (1979 - 1981).  The study's goal was to determine what strategies these banks
were using and what they believed to be the key to their continued profitability.  Variable- or
adjustable-rate loans were the high-performance banks’ favorite way of dealing with interest-rate risk. 
Bankers also considered short maturities important, on both loans and investments, because it also
provides more liquidity and flexibility.
                    
1  This was followed by the passage of another law, the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.
 The provisions of this act may be viewed in some respects as dealing with the problems that the 1980 legislation had
not resolved (Cooper and Fraser).
2  For example, there was tremendous growth in the money market deposit account (MMDAs),  which grew to
over $300 billion (15 percent of total deposits) within three months after their introduction on December 14, 1982
(Keely and Zimmermann).  This inflow of money into MMDAs came from different sources: small time deposits,
large certificates of deposit, and from money market mutual funds (MMMFs).  The MMDA allowed small savers to
earn a higher return on deposits with easy access to their money.4
A bank can also adjust its portfolio of assets (e.g., loans, treasury securities, federal funds sold) toward
a portfolio that rapidly adjusts to changes in the market rate of interest.  Hence, the bank can reduce its
loan volume in favor of treasury securities and federal funds sold.  For example, when Barkley, et al.
regressed bank loan-to-deposit ratios against time deposits-to-total deposit ratios (and other dependent
variables) for Arizona and Colorado banks using 1977 - 1980 data, the estimated coefficient had a
positive and statistically significant sign. This confirmed their hypothesis that a longer term structure of
liabilities permits a bank to decrease the liquidity of its assets by increasing its loan investments. 
Similarly, Barry and Pepper regressed bank loan-to-deposit ratios against the ratio of time deposits less
than $100,000 to total assets (and other dependent variables) for Illinois and Iowa banks using 1978
data.  The estimated coefficient was also positive, although it was statistically insignificant.
This strategy of reducing the proportion of loans in the asset portfolio, in favor of securities and federal
funds, lowers asset acquisition and maintenance costs in addition to enhancing the liquidity of the
banking firm.  However, because of their high liquidity and low default risk (particularly treasury
securities) the expected return on these investments is lower.  In spite of lower expected returns, some
banking firms may find this the best response to the increase in interest sensitive deposits.  Given this
trade-off, the extent to which the banking firm will substitute treasuries and federal funds sold for loans
will depend on management's risk-return preferences.  Less risk averse managers will take high risk
investments with the attendant risks as noted in the Gunther study cited earlier.  More risk averse
managers will have a larger proportion of safe assets in their portfolios.
Other opportunities for maintaining  profitability might include increasing service charges for checking
accounts, trust department services, and other services.  Of course a bank runs the risk of jeopardizing
its competitive position if other depository institutions in its market do not also raise their service
charges.  In addition, a bank can lower its expenses by enhancing operating efficiency through
automation and advanced training of employees.  This will lower its total cost, thus maintaining or
boosting its net profit, without substantial changes in its portfolio management practices.
                                                                           
interest revenue.  Note that increasing ri  might not necessarily achieve the desired objective since this lowers the
recovery parameter, rendering the outcome indeterminate.5
Banks can close non-profitable branches, particularly those that were opened during the era of
regulation Q as a means of attracting deposits (Flannery).  There are also potential cost savings with
mergers and acquisitions.
The preceding discussion identifies an array of options that banks might take to maintain and enhance
their profitability in a deregulated environment.  These include the increased use of adjustable-rate
loans, shortening loan maturities, taking on riskier loans at higher promised yields (which increases the
probability of bank failure), tightening credit standards among the more conservative institutions,
increasing service charges, and lowering operating costs.  It was also noted that risk averse managers
may structure their asset portfolios to include a greater proportion of assets with rates that easily and
quickly adjust in tandem with changes in market rates.  However, little empirical work has examined
the extent to which this might have occurred since deregulation.  The Barkley et al., and the Barry and
Pepper studies cited above used pre-deregulation data, and did not look at individual loan categories. 
There is a need to assess changes that have occurred in the composition of deposits at commercial
banks following deregulation and the extent to which commercial bank asset portfolios reflect these
changes.
Data and Methods
Using Texas data, this study assessed changes in commercial bank deposit and asset variables
following commercial bank deregulation of the early 1980s, to draw implications for agricultural
lending.  Commercial bank data for 1978 (representing the pre-deregulation period) and 1987
(representing the post-deregulation period) were used for this analysis.  Commercial bank deregulation
started taking place in 1980.  The year 1979 was unsuitable for pre-deregulation analysis because
banks may have started reacting to the anticipated legislation during that year.  Thus, 1978 was
considered a more appropriate year for pre-deregulation analysis.  Deregulation was carried out in
phases and the last phase was in 1986.  Thus, 1987 was the first year after the completion of the
deregulation process and was picked to represent the post-deregulation period.  The following sections
describe the variables used, the test statistic employed, the sample selection process, and the study
limitations.6
Variable Description
The deposit variables used in the study included:  (1) large time deposits, i.e., time deposits of
$100,000 or more, and (2) demand deposits.  Large time deposits were further disaggregated into (a)
large certificates of deposit, and (b) other large time deposits.  Bank assets included:  (1) cash, (2)
securities, (3) federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to resell (federal funds), (4)
loans, and (5) other assets.  Loans were further disaggregated into (a) real estate loans, (b) agricultural
production loans, (c) commercial and industrial loans, (d) household loans, and (e) other loans.
Each asset category was defined following the Condition and Income Report Tape Documentation
(U.S. Dept. of Commerce).  “Cash” refers not only to currency and coin in vaults, but also to cash
balances due from depository institutions (which include cash items in process of collection and
unposted debits), balances due from banks in foreign countries and foreign central banks, balances due
from depository institutions in the U.S., and balances due from the federal reserve banks. “Securities”
refers to the total book value of securities and corporate stocks excluding trading account securities. 
This is the total of U.S. treasury securities, U.S. government agency and corporation obligations,
securities issued by states and political subdivisions in the U.S., other domestic securities (debt and
equity), and foreign securities (debt and equity).
Cash and securities reflect the liquidity of the bank.  However, small banks rely more heavily on cash
and securities to meet liquidity needs than do large money center and regional banks.  The regional
banks routinely borrow in the money markets to help meet deposit outflows or to finance incremental
loan demand (Koch, p. 399).  This point should be considered when interpreting the results of cash and
security holdings.
“Loans” refers to the aggregate gross book value of total loans before deducting valuation reserves. 
Loans were further categorized as:  (a) loans secured by real estate, (b) loans for agricultural
production and other loans to farmers, (c) commercial and industrial loans, and (d) loans to individuals
for household, family, and other expenditure.  These categories of major loan purposes were selected
because the FDIC reported them continuously over the study period.  “Other assets” were computed as
total assets minus all the above categories.8
banks used in the study had been in existence for at least 15 years, i.e., six years before December
1978, and were still in operation in December 1987.  Using banks that had been in existence for at least
15 years also facilitated making comparisons between the same banks at two points in time, i.e.,
December 1978 and December 1987.  It was important to use the same banks to assess whether or not
changes in deposit and asset composition had occurred within the same banks.
The selected banks were grouped into two categories:  rural banks, defined as banks located outside
standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs), and urban banks, defined as banks located inside
SMSAs.  Together, there were 530 rural banks, and 500 urban banks.  A test for changes in means of
deposit and asset variables was performed for each bank group.
Both rural and urban banks were also grouped as independent banks and banks affiliated with bank
holding companies.  A distinction was made between banks affiliated with a one-bank holding company
(OBHC) and banks affiliated with a multi-bank holding company (MBHC).  There were only four
urban and nine rural banks that belonged to an OBHC in 1978 and still belonged to an OBHC in 1987.
 For lack of an adequate number of observations, no pre- and post-deregulation mean comparisons
were performed on OBHC affiliates.  Among rural banks, 195 banks remained independent over the
15-year time period, but only 44 banks that had been affiliated to MBHCs before 1978 had remained
so as of December 1987.
4  Among urban banks, 87 remained independent and 144 remained affiliated
to MBHCs during the entire period.  Banks were excluded from this analysis if their status changed
during the 15-year time period.
Other Factors
This study looks at changes in deposit and asset composition between 1978 and 1987 to establish the
extent to which changes in the deposit structure might have triggered some changes in the asset
                    
4  The sum of independent rural banks, and rural bank holding company affiliates (i.e., banks owned by an
OBHC plus MBHC affiliates) is not equal to the total number of all rural banks in the sample.  Whereas a bank might
have been rural and independent in 1978, it might still be rural in 1987, but no longer independent (e.g., rural, but
MBHC affiliated by 1987).  This bank was included in the “All Rural Banks” sub-sample, but it was not included
among independent banks (since it did not remain independent) or the MBHC-affiliated banks (since it was not
MBHC-affiliated in both periods).9
portfolio mix at Texas commercial banks.  There were several events taking place during that time
period, apart from deregulation, which influenced asset allocation among Texas commercial banks.
Lower commodity prices and land prices, and higher and more volatile interest rates beginning in the
early 1980s lowered farm profitability and increased farm loan delinquencies and defaults.  Banks
responded to the higher than normal farm loan delinquencies and defaults by reducing their farm loan
portfolios.  Some banks tightened credit policies in response to their lending experience and pressure
from bank regulators.  An increase in borrower right provisions made it more difficult for lenders to
collect on delinquent loans, thus increasing the likelihood of loan losses.  Also, correspondent
relationships, such as participation in overlines of large farm loans, were strained as credit
requirements were raised and urban banks shifted away from farm loans.  There was also a poor
performance of the non-farm economy in the early to mid-1980s.
All these factors influence bank asset allocation decisions.  It is necessary, therefore, to disentangle the
effects of deregulation from those of other events taking place during the same time period.  In his
study of the performance of commercial banks in the Eleventh District of the Federal Reserve System
(which covers Texas, southern New Mexico, and northern Louisiana), Yeats reports that the local
economy in this region started recovering in 1987.  To the extent that the unfavorable economic
environment could have influenced commercial bank asset allocation decisions, one would expect a
movement toward previous (although not necessarily the exact) asset mixes as the farm and non-farm
economy recovered.  Therefore, this study assesses whether or not banks started moving toward
previous asset mixes as the recovery was under way.
Results
Deposit Composition
The proportion of demand deposits relative to total deposits among rural banks fell drastically from 44.8% to
16.3%, a 28.5 percentage point decline between 1978 and 1987. At the same time the share of large time
deposits (mostly C.D.s) increased from 9.1% to 17.7%, i.e., an increase of 8.6 percentage points (Table 1). 
Thus, there was a major shift from low cost deposits to high cost deposits after deregulation.  Although10
independent banks decreased their average holdings of demand deposits more than MBHC affiliates after
deregulation, MBHC affiliates increased their average holdings of large C.D.s more than independent banks,
and continued to rely more heavily on costly deposits relative to independent banks.
Similarly, there was a sharp decline in the share of demand deposits among urban bank deposits, falling from
42.5% to 18.2%, a 24.3 percentage point decline between 1978 and 1987 (Table 2).  The share of large time
deposits (mostly C.D.s) increased from 16.0% to 23.5%, i.e., an increase of 7.5 percentage points.  Thus, as
expected, there has been a shift by both rural and urban banks toward rate sensitive deposits after
deregulation.
Bank Assets
In addition to (and partly in response to) changes in their deposit structure, commercial banks
undertook a significant asset reallocation of their portfolios during this time period.  For example, the
proportion of loans relative to total assets at rural banks decreased by 5.1 percentage points, whereas
the proportion of securities increased by 16.2 percentage points (Table 3).  These changes were even
more dramatic when the analysis was conducted on independents and MBHC-affiliates separately.  For
instance, the share of securities in asset portfolios at independent banks was up 20.5 percentage points,
but increased only 9.5 percentage points among MBHC-affiliates.  On the other hand, MBHC-affiliates
and independent banks reduced the share of their loan holdings by 8.8 and 6.7 percentage points,
respectively.  Moreover, the share of federal funds was up 11.0 percentage points among MBHC-
affiliates, although the figure for independents stayed virtually unchanged at around 7%.
This asset re-allocation among rural banks could in part be a reflection of a more aggressive
gap management strategy by commercial banks after deregulation, perhaps a response to increased use
of costly and more rate sensitive deposits.  However, some of the shift from loans to securities could
also reflect a lack of suitable loan investment opportunities in Texas during the mid 1980s.  As noted
earlier, the Texas economy experienced some difficulties during this time period.  (This is discussed
below, under “Recent Developments”).  The increased share of federal funds held is partly a reflection
of the growth in funds transfer technology in recent years, making them a very valuable money
management tool.  Large banks, in particular, engage more heavily in the federal funds market as part11
Table 1.  Selected Deposit Composition of Rural Banks in Texas Before and After Deregulation









All Rural Banks, n=530




0.049 0.069 0.070 0.154 0.167 0.097 0.098
*
Other Time 0.017 0.022 0.029 0.003 0.009 0.033 -0.013
*
Demand 0.419 0.448 0.131 0.148 0.163 0.093 -0.285
*
Independent Rural Banks, n = 195




0.038 0.059 0.065 0.136 0.148 0.086 0.089
*
  Other Time 0.015 0.021 0.030 0.000 0.008 0.024 -0.013
*
Demand 0.445 0.481 0.156 0.150 0.178 0.126 -0.303
*
Rural Banks Associated with Multi-Bank Holding Companies, n = 44




0.063 0.092 0.078 0.187 0.207 0.110 0.115
*
Other Time 0.019 0.024 0.033 0.003 0.013 0.036 -0.011 
Demand 0.395 0.410 0.067 0.139 0.150 0.063 -0.260
*
a  This is the difference between the mean in 1987 (after deregulation) and the mean in 1978 (before
deregulation). 
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.12
Table 2.  Selected Deposit Composition of Urban Banks in Texas Before and After Deregulation









All Urban Banks, n = 500
Large Time: 0.132 0.160 0.117 0.223 0.235 0.119 0.075
*
Large C.D.s 0.102 0.129 0.105 0.215 0.225 0.115 0.096
*
Others Time 0.022 0.032 0.044 0.003 0.010 0.028 -0.022
*
Demand 0.421 0.425 0.087 0.173 0.182 0.061 -0.243
*
Independent Urban Banks, n = 87
Large Time: 0.073 0.100 0.082 0.168 0.171 0.090 0.071
*
Large C.D.s 0.053 0.074 0.079 0.159 0.165 0.090 0.091
*
Other Time 0.020 0.025 0.028 0.003 0.006 0.009 -0.019
*
Demand 0.411 0.438 0.118 0.176 0.183 0.067 -0.255
*
Urban Banks Associated with Multi-Bank Holding Companies, n = 144
Large Time: 0.189 0.207 0.126 0.301 0.304 0.111 0.097
*
Large C.D.s 0.142 0.161 0.108 0.286 0.289 0.103 0.128
*
Other Time 0.026 0.046 0.059 0.003 0.015 0.036 -0.031
*
Demand 0.427 0.431 0.068 0.169 0.182 0.068 -0.249
*
a  This is the difference between the mean in 1987 (after deregulation) and the mean in 1978 (before
deregulation).
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.13










All Rural Banks, n = 530
Cash 0.121 0.134 0.051 0.095 0.122 0.088 -0.012
*
Securities 0.136 0.154 0.114 0.312 0.316 0.162 0.162
*
Federal Funds 0.039 0.054 0.055 0.056 0.081 0.095 0.027
*
Loans 0.520 0.505 0.126 0.453 0.454 0.152 -0.051
*
Other Assets 0.143 0.153 0.141 0.023 0.027 0.020 -0.126
*
Independent Rural Banks, n = 195
Cash 0.121 0.134 0.050 0.103 0.130 0.094 -0.004 
Securities 0.137 0.156 0.117 0.355 0.361 0.164 0.205
*
Federal Funds 0.050 0.065 0.060 0.061 0.077 0.075 0.012 
Loans 0.485 0.474 0.128 0.403 0.407 0.155 -0.067
*
Other Assets 0.160 0.172 0.137 0.021 0.024 0.019 -0.148
*
Rural Banks Associated with Multi-Bank Holding Companies, n = 44
Cash 0.116 0.130 0.043 0.077 0.091 0.060 -0.039
*
Securities 0.178 0.181 0.096 0.311 0.276 0.158 0.095
*
Federal Funds 0.028 0.044 0.050 0.074 0.154 0.194 0.110
*
Loans 0.567 0.541 0.115 0.456 0.453 0.129 -0.088
*
Other Assets 0.087 0.104 0.111 0.025 0.026 0.016 -0.078
*
a  This is the difference between the mean in 1987 (after deregulation) and the mean in 1978 (before
deregulation).
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.14
of their asset/liability management strategy (Koch).  Thus, MBHC-affiliates (which are usually large
institutions compared to independent banks) appear to rely less on securities, but more on federal funds
as a source of liquidity than do independent banks.
In contrast to rural banks, urban banks held a bigger proportion of loans in their asset portfolio
both before and after deregulation (55% versus 50% in 1978, and 52% versus 45% in 1987), and
urban banks reduced the share of these loans by only 2.8 percentage points compared to the rural
banks’ reduction of 5.1 percentage points after deregulation (Tables 3 and 4).  MBHC affiliates held
more loans in their asset portfolio than independent banks before and after deregulation.  Both reduced
their loan shares by 5.0 and 6.1 percentage points, respectively.
Although urban banks held a smaller proportion of  federal funds  relative to their assets in 1978 than
did rural banks (4.5% versus 5.4%), the situation had been reversed by 1987, with urban banks
increasing the share of federal funds to 13.0%, compared to the rural banks’ 8.1%.  Similar to their
rural counterparts, urban MBHC-affiliated banks rely less on securities and more on federal funds for
liquidity management and investment than do independent banks.  MBHC affiliates increased the share
of federal funds by 18.1 percentage points to 22.5% after deregulation, but independent banks only
increased the share of federal funds by 1.8 percentage points to 7.3% (Table 4).  Thus, the federal
funds market is the preferred choice of urban MBHC affiliates.
Loan Portfolio
Although the proportion of loans as a whole declined in asset portfolios across all banks
between 1978 and 1987, there were gainers and losers among loan categories within the same time
period.  For example, the proportion of agricultural loans declined by 6.2 percentage points among
rural banks, but real estate loans were up by 14 percentage points over the same time period (Table 5).
 As expected, the growth in real estate loans was more pronounced among urban banks, up by 20.5
percentage points (Table 6).  Note that urban independent banks held a higher percentage of their loan
portfolio in agricultural loans compared to urban MBHC-affiliates both before and after deregulation
(Table 6).  As discussed earlier, these changes in loan composition do in part reflect the poor
performance of Texas' farm economy over this period.15










All Urban Banks, n = 500
Cash 0.121 0.128 0.043 0.085 0.112 0.086 -0.016
*
Securities 0.162 0.196 0.143 0.163 0.197 0.152 0.001 
Federal Funds 0.032 0.045 0.048 0.071 0.130 0.156 0.085
*
Loans 0.561 0.551 0.096 0.541 0.523 0.154 -0.028
*
Other Assets 0.023 0.080 0.146 0.033 0.038 0.036 -0.042
*
Independent Urban Banks, n = 87
Cash 0.117 0.126 0.043 0.088 0.109 0.064 -0.017
*
Securities 0.122 0.134 0.102 0.321 0.325 0.172 0.191
*
Federal Funds 0.040 0.055 0.054 0.056 0.073 0.085 0.018 
Loans 0.526 0.519 0.102 0.469 0.458 0.156 -0.061
*
Other Assets 0.162 0.166 0.134 0.032 0.035 0.030 -0.131
*
Urban Banks Associated with Multi-Bank Holding Companies. n = 144
Cash 0.126 0.130 0.041 0.075 0.112 0.102 -0.018 
Securities 0.229 0.261 0.138 0.086 0.124 0.117 -0.137 
Federal Funds 0.029 0.044 0.046 0.174 0.225 0.192 0.181
*
Loans 0.559 0.558 0.090 0.518 0.508 0.147 -0.050
*
Other Assets 0.021 0.007 0.137 0.027 0.031 0.024 0.024
*
a  This is the difference between the mean in 1987 (after deregulation) and the mean in 1978 (before
deregulation).
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.16










All Rural Banks, n = 530
Real Estate 0.208 0.216  0.130 0.359 0.356 0.168 0.140
*
Agricultural 0.168 0.226 0.199  0.095 0.164 0.180 -0.062
*
Commercial
and Industrial 0.203 0.218 0.118 0.209 0.217 0.108 -0.001 
Household 0.303 0.310 0.137 0.212 0.236 0.138 -0.074
*
Independent Rural Banks, n = 195
Real Estate 0.203 0.204 0.130 0.330 0.329 0.162 0.125
*
Agricultural 0.180 0.237 0.198 0.111 0.173 0.175 -0.064
*
Commercial
and Industrial 0.194 0.208 0.111 0.201 0.205 0.110 -0.003 
Household 0.311 0.320 0.136 0.241 0.268 0.154 -0.052
*
Rural Banks Associated with Multi-Bank Holding Companies, n = 44
Real Estate 0.221 0.234 0.133 0.384 0.358 0.171 0.124
*
Agricultural 0.183 0.246 0.205 0.106 0.194 0.205 -0.052
*
Commercial
and Industrial 0.210 0.218 0.103 0.212 0.229 0.120 0.011 
Household 0.245 0.278 0.126 0.190 0.194 0.085 -0.084
*
a  This is the difference between the mean in 1987 (after deregulation) and the mean in 1978 (before
deregulation).
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.17










All Urban Banks, n = 500
Real Estate 0.226 0.237 0.110 0.456 0.442 0.148 0.205
*
Agricultural 0.006 0.048 0.086 0.001 0.027 0.057 -0.021
*
Commercial
and Industrial 0.292 0.300 0.143 0.250 0.264 0.119 -0.036
*
Household 0.364 0.374 0.138 0.186 0.215 0.133 -0.159
*
Independent Urban Banks, n = 87
Real Estate 0.225 0.237 0.113 0.394 0.385 0.158 0.148
*
Agricultural 0.044 0.091 0.108 0.016 0.054 0.080 -0.037
*
Commercial
and Industrial 0.230 0.245 0.111 0.240 0.246 0.122 0.001 
Household 0.350 0.386 0.112 0.239 0.290 0.153 -0.096
*
Urban Banks Associated with Multi-Bank Holding Companies, n = 144
Real Estate 0.233 0.251 0.112 0.450 0.447 0.140 0.196
*
Agricultural 0.002 0.024 0.062 0.000 0.014 0.032 -0.010 
Commercial
and Industrial 0.340 0.335 0.143 0.254 0.272 0.113 -0.063
*
Household 0.337 0.342 0.140 0.156 0.180 0.113 -0.162
*
a  This is the difference between the mean in 1987 (after deregulation) and the mean in 1978 (before
deregulation).
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.18
It should also be noted that a decrease in the proportion of agricultural loans in bank asset
portfolios does not necessarily imply a reduction in the absolute volume of agricultural loans. 
Agricultural loan ratios can decline when absolute agricultural loan amounts are increasing.
5  What can
be said  here is that one can potentially have a sub-optimal growth in agricultural credit as bankers
respond to different pressures, particularly those relating to the need for a new balance
between loan and non-loan investment opportunities.  To the extent that this is true, a significant
reduction of agricultural loans as a percentage of the total loan portfolio implies that it may be more
difficult for agricultural borrowers to obtain loans they would otherwise receive.
Recent Developments
As noted earlier, both the farm and non-farm sectors were facing severe financial difficulties in
the early to mid-1980s.  To the extent that the above asset re-allocation was a direct response to
changes in the local economy, one would expect a movement toward previous (although not necessarily
the same) loan levels and asset mixes after the crisis was over.  As Yeats reports, the Texas economy
started emerging out of recession in 1978.  By using loan and asset information from Yeats' study, it
was possible to demonstrate the post-1987 trend in loan to asset ratios.  As this information is for all
the Eleventh District commercial banks of the Federal Reserve System (i.e., Texas, northern Louisiana,
southern New Mexico), it is not an exact match of the data reported in this study.  Thus, only the trend
is of much significance.  Results show that loan ratios continued to exhibit a declining trend even after
the 1987 recovery was well underway, i.e., 54.77% in 1987, 50.33% in 1988, 45.91% in 1989, and
44.58% in 1990.  Based on this information, it appears that changes in bank asset allocation cannot be
fully explained by the performance of the local economy.  This lends credence to the proposition that
other factors, such as those discussed earlier in the paper, have played, and might still be playing, a
major role in influencing bank asset allocation decisions.
                    
5  In fact, the total nominal outstanding farm debt held by commercial banks in the U.S. increased from $34.4
billion in 1978 to $40.7 billion in 1987 (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture).  However, as information on total nation-wide
bank loans (and total assets) was not available, it was not possible to judge whether or not this growth in agricultural
loans was amid increasing, constant, or declining agricultural loan to total loan ratios (or total loan to total asset
ratios).19
Summary and Concluding Remarks
Balance sheets of commercial banks in the U.S. have undergone important changes since the
passage of DIDMCA in 1980.  For instance, there was an increase in large time deposits held by banks and a
decrease in demand deposits.  Although the increase in large time deposits enhanced the stability of the
deposit base by reducing fluctuations in deposit volume, it exposed banks to additional intermediation costs,
as well as interest rate risk.  Past literature documents a range of options that commercial banks have taken
or would be likely to take in response to the increased cost of deposits and the additional interest rate risk. 
These include:  increased use of adjustable-rate loans, shortening loan maturities, taking on riskier loans with
higher promised yields, tightening credit standards by the more risk averse managers, increasing service
charges, and lowering operating costs.  It is also possible that risk averse managers may structure their asset
portfolios more in favor of non-loan assets that have rates that quickly and easily adjust in tandem with
changes in market rates.  However, little empirical work has examined the extent to which this might have
occurred since deregulation. 
The purpose of this study was to examine changes that have occurred to commercial bank deposits
since deregulation, and how this might have affected asset allocation among these banks.  Results confirm
findings in past literature that there have been major shifts in bank deposit structures and deposits are now
weighted more heavily toward high cost deposits.  Results also show that banks have decreased the share of
loans in their portfolios, but increased the share of securities and federal funds.  This has occurred more
among rural banks than urban banks.  In addition to the general reduction in the share of loans in commercial
bank asset portfolios, there has also been a significant decline in agricultural production loans held by
commercial banks relative to total bank loans.  Several factors have contributed to this phenomenon.
This could be a reflection of a dearth of investment opportunities or a flight to safety during the
study period (1978 - 1987).  However, data show that there was a persistent decline in the total loan to asset
ratios, even after the region's economic recovery in 1987.  This discounts the flight to safety notion as the
only explanation for declining loan ratios.  The change in asset allocation could also be a reflection of a desire
by banks to invest in assets with interest that adjusts concurrently with interest charges on bank deposits. 
Increased use of federal funds could also reflect the growth in funds transfer technology in recent years,
which large banks in particular find to be a very valuable money management tool.20
Bank asset allocation as a response to changes in the deposit structure may have major implications
for agriculture.  This could mean, for example, that some farmers, who before deregulation may have
obtained a loan, ceteris paribus, may not be extended credit in a deregulated environment.  Banks may seek to
improve the quality of their loan portfolios by eliminating what was previously acceptable risk, investing
more in securities, and participating more in the federal funds market.
Although this study shows that changes in deposit structures at commercial banks could adversely
affect agricultural lending, it does not reveal the extent to which this might have occurred, partly because of
other factors involved.  However, to the extent that banks consider the cost of funds and interest rate
variability in their investment decisions, there is a need for understanding whether or not deregulation will
lead to a diminution of funds to the agricultural sector, an increase in the price of funds to agricultural
borrowers, or less accessibility of credit to farmers leading to a highly segregated market.  These issues need
to be further addressed in future research.21
References
Barkley, David L., Cindy Mellon, and Glenn T. Potts.  “Effects of Banking Structure on the Allocation of
Credit to Non-metropolitan Communities.”  West. J. Agr. Econ. 9, 283-292 (1984).
Barry, Peter J., and W.H. Pepper.  “Effects of Holding Company Affiliation on Loan-Deposit Relationships
in Agricultural Banking.”  N. Cent. J. Agr. Econ. 7, 65-73 (1985).
Brown, Judy. “How High-Performance Community Banks Cope With the Effects of Deregulation.”  Journal
of Retail Banking. 5, 17-24 (Fall 1983).
Cooper, S. Kerry, and Donald R. Fraser.  The Financial Marketplace.  Third Edition, Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1990.
Flannery, Mark J.  “Removing Deposit Rate Ceilings:  How Will Bank Portfolios Fare?”  Business Review. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, March/April 1983, pp. 13-21.
Gunther, Jeffrey W.  “Texas Banking Conditions: Managerial Versus Economic Factors.”  Financial
Industry Studies, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, October 1989, pp. 1-18.
Gunther, Jeffrey W.  “Financial Strategies and Performance of Newly Established Texas Banks.”  Financial
Industry Studies, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, December 1990), pp. 9-14.
Keeley, Michael C. and Gary C. Zimmermann.  “Competition of Money Market Deposit Accounts.” 
Proceedings: A Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 
May 1985, pp. 612-635.
Koch, Timothy W.  Bank Management. Orlando, FL:  The Dryden Press, 1988.
Leatham, David J. and John A. Hopkin. “Transition in Agriculture:  A Strategic Assessment of Agriculture
and Banking.”  Agribusiness.   4 (2),157-165 (1988).
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  “Agricultural Income and Finance: Situation and Outlook Report.”  U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, AFO-40, Feb. 1991.
U.S. Department of Commerce.  “Condition and Income Report Tape Documentation.” U.S. Department of
Commerce National Technical Information Service, December 1988.
Yeats, Kevin J.  “A Return to Profitability:  The Performance of Eleventh District Commercial Banks.” 
Economic Review.  Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, July 1991.